Wednesday, March 19, 2025

Are good institutions enough? - V

Humans have always struggled with the question of how to design institutions that make self-interested individual action result in the welfare of society. This situation is sought to be achieved by market institutions. But there is a large sphere of behaviour that is not governed by legislation. 

Around 1919, a man named John Fletcher Moulton, an English mathematician, barrister, judge, and Member of Parliament, gave a speech which was transcribed verbatim by someone in the audience. It was published in The Atlantic in 1924 with the title "Law and Manners". There was no transcript of the speech and if someone in the audience had not written it down, it would have been lost. (It was published after his death. I came to know about this speech from this episode of the podcast econtalk

In the speech, he says that there are three great domains of human action. First comes the domain of positive law, where our actions are prescribed by laws which must be obeyed. Next comes the domain of free choice, which includes all those actions in which we claim and enjoy complete freedom. But between these two domains there is a third large and important domain which doesn’t get much attention these days. 

Here there is no law which tells us what should be done, and yet we feel that we are not free to do whatever we feel like doing. The freedom of action that we have will vary from case to case and will depend on our discretion. It grades from a consciousness of a duty nearly as strong as positive law to a feeling that the matter is just a question of personal choice. This is the domain of Obedience to the Unenforceable. "The obedience is the obedience of a man to that which he cannot be forced to obey. He is the enforcer of the law upon himself."

That is a brilliant phrase - "obedience to the unenforceable". Moulton gets at the fact that if you take the idea of a "free debate" literally, the debate will be destroyed. The assumption regarding a "free debate" is that you don't actually say whatever you want because that destroys debate. A "free debate" is not totally free. You have to recognise that there are unenforceable obligations of self-governance.   

If you have a set of norms surrounding speech, where people are given freedom and there's very few formal restrictions and we rely on obedience to the unenforceable, then it is better to leave it alone. But once you fail to be obedient to that unenforceable obligation, creating that obligation is very difficult.  If everyone else is talking too long and you respect this norm, then you feel like a sucker. You start to say, : "I'm a fool. Doing what's right is foolish." And then you've lost that norm.

Moulton's analysis suggests that we have a set of impulses which, over time, we can either cultivate or we can desist from doing. So, if I have the right to do something and I always do it, then I am cultivating a habit of vice. But, if I say, 'No, I shouldn't do that: that would be wrong, even though I can do it' then I am cultivating habit of doing the right thing. So, if a situation comes along that happens to be in the third domain of Moulton's framework, I know what the right thing to do is even though it is unenforceable because I've made it a habit. 

If we all cultivate that habit, then the society that we live in is much better for everyone. If I'm the only one doing that, I'm a chump and it won't work. If everyone else does it but I don't do it, I start to corrode their commitment to those habits. So, it really is important that when I look around, I see everyone else doing it.

The modern trend is to expand the scope of what Moulton calls law to prescribe things through the power of the state. But things that are legal are not necessarily things that should be done. And similarly, many things that should not be done perhaps should not be illegal. They should just be part of what Lord Moulton was calling manners or "obedience to the unenforceable". Many things should not be enforced through the state but through our social interaction. Many people underestimate the importance of moral strictures that we obey because they are the right thing to do. This is what Moulton emphasised when he used the term "obedience to the unenforceable". 

Adam Smith thought that over time, human beings both individually and collectively, were capable of perfecting a kind of self-governance. Much of our behaviour would actually be governed by the reactions of others, represented by the impartial spectator, which we had internalised to a great extent. He says in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that my desire for your approval and your desire to avoid my disapproval, is the foundation of civilisation.  It pushes us in a direction of doing the right thing.

He's aware it doesn't work all the time and that sometimes laws are necessary, but there's an impulse toward being a decent human being even when you don't want to be, because you don't want to lose the respect of the people around you. But modern economists will say that these are all principal-agent problems and all we have to do is design a set of rules and impose those in order to solve them. 

Thus, the eagerness and willingness to "do the right thing" has been eroded. This puts pressure on the state to use the power of the state to enforce the things that were once unenforceable. This, in turn crowds out the natural impulse of norms and institutions to emerge that would enforce these without the state. This back and forth between our imperfection in creating a demand for government intervention and then that government intervention crippling our ability to solve these problems is a positive feedback loop that is difficult to arrest once it begins.

A lot of what's disturbing about the world right now is the erosion of those norms. We are left with  disobedience to the unenforceable and facing the choice of having to legislate improvements.


Tuesday, March 4, 2025

Are good institutions enough? - IV

Bureaucracies ­display large differences in their capabilities. In third world countries especially, bureaucracies are regarded as corrupt and bureaucrats are regarded as cogs who surrender their discretion to politicians. In Making Bureaucracy Work: Norms, Education and Public Service Delivery in Rural India, Akshay Mangla investigates why some bureaucracies perform more effectively than ­others. He investigates the delivery of primary education in rural north India, an unlikely setting for public services to function well. Some states in the Hindi belt perform far better than expected, while others show sluggish and uneven progress. 

India’s failure to provide quality public services is not for want of resources or an absence of political will.  With economic liberalization in the 1990s, state control of the economy receded, but social programming expanded substantially in some areas. The Midday Meal Programme provides a free daily meal in more than 2 million government schools. The 2010 Right to Education [RTE] Act places a legally enforceable duty on the state to guarantee free and compulsory education for all children of ages 6 to 14 years. Not all developing countries have such progressive social legislation. Yet, there are wide variations in educational achievements between states. 

In the Himalayan region, Himachal Pradesh stands out as a leader in primary education within India. It lags only behind Kerala. HP’s educational achievements are even more remarkable than Kerala’s in many ways. HP’s mountainous topography, harsh climate and low population density make the administration of services far more challenging. At independence, Kerala had a substantial lead in literacy (47.2 percent) over the rest of India, whereas HP (at 8 percent) was among the least literate states in the country. Since the 1980s, HP has surged ahead of other states, with educational gains broadly shared by women, lower castes and tribal populations. This is in contrast to the adjacent state of Uttarakhand, which has similar economic and sociocultural characteristics to HP. It performs much worse in primary education, even though it had a substantially higher literacy rate (19 percent) around independence.

You will be given explanations for such variations. It will be said that modernization and economic development lead to improvements in public service delivery. As an economy develops, the state accumulates resources and citizens acquire new abilities to demand primary education. You will be told that there is a virtuous cycle between growing affluence and good governance. Economic growth leads to increased social spending as well as improvements in bureaucratic quality. 

Although social spending in India increased significantly in the 1990s, implementation of social programs is uneven. Several lower-income states in India have made substantial gains in primary education and other aspects of human development, outperforming wealthier states. An economic laggard like UP made notable gains in enrollment and infrastructure provision, while performing quite inadequately on other dimensions of implementation. Services in UP’s more affluent western belt is similar to that in poorer parts of the state. Economic development alone doesn’t explain these differences. 

Another common argument will concern geography - villages further away from urban centers perform worse on many dimensions of governance. There is also an urban bias in development. But HP performs better than other states despite comparatively low urbanization and population density, scattered settlement patterns, unfriendly climate and terrain, making it costlier to provide services. On the other hand, Uttarakhand performs markedly worse than HP despite similar physical characteristics.

Another common argument is about the type of institutions present -  the formal structure of constitut­ions, electoral systems, rules of federalism and executive power. Yet, formal institutions cannot account for variation in the performance of different state  bureaucracies since they all operate under a common legal, fiscal and electoral framework. 

It is also argued that different types of colonial institutions produce lasting effects on economic performance. So the author compares districts of HP and Uttarakhand having similar histories of direct British rule and military recruitment, but different contemporary patterns of education service delivery. He also examined districts of UP with different colonial land tenure systems, but similar implementation patterns. 

The above factors – economic development, geography, formal institutions and colonial administrative legacies – are important, but they do not fully explain variation in how states in northern India implement policy.  He finds that this difference depends on the informal norms that guide bureaucratic behavior. These norms guide public officials on how to interpret the instructions of their political masters and take appropriate actions. These norms influence how officials interact with individuals and groups in society which influences how the public views the bureaucracy. 

As ­citizens gain exposure to the local state, their experiences condition future expectations and the collective monitoring of schools, impacting the quality of services. Bureaucratic norms have evolved differently across Indian states even though they have common political, legal and administrative institutions. He finds two types of bureaucracies - “deliberative” and “legalistic" - which have different mechanisms for policy implementation.

Deliberative bureaucracy encouraged flexibility in the interpretation of rules. Lower-level bureaucrats learn to discuss problems collectively with senior officials, transmitting local knowledge throughout the system. This enables officials to undertake complex tasks and adapt policies to varying local needs. It includes rural women, lower castes and other marginalized groups in the decision-making process which yields higher quality services.

In contrast, legalistic bureaucracy, encourages officials to strictly follow the rules resulting in a rigid interpretation of policy. Lower-level officials treat policy rules as binding constraints and show no personal initiative on how to apply ­policies in particular cases. It results in poor implementation of projects that require repeated state–society interactions. It creates administrative burdens for marginalized groups and tend to reinforce inequalities. Thus legalistic bureaucracy leads to uneven policy implementation. 

These distinct types of bureaucratic norms produce very different implementation patterns and outcomes for primary education.